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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 960100-CA 
DAVID DELL DRAGE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION ANP NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance (heroin), a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1996). This Court 
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the police 
had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant, who was present in a 
private home when officers executed a no-knock search warrant 
looking for drug dealing, drug use, and a parole fugitive? 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the officer, 
having frisked defendant and felt a syringe in his pocket, had 
probable cause to then open defendant's jacket and seize the 
contraband? 
3. Did the trial court properly determine that the search 
of defendant's pocket could also be justified as a search 
incident to his arrest? 
The same standard of review applies to each of these three 
issues. Whether a given set of facts gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause or constitutes a search incident to 
arrest presents a legal question. Nonetheless, in reviewing the 
question, the appellate court grants a "measure of discretion," 
falling short of "a close, de novo review," to the trial court's 
determination. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRQVISIQNS, STATUTES ANp RULES 
Any relevant provisions, statutes, or rules will be cited in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (heroin) within a 
thousand feet of a school, and one count of unlawful possession 
of drug paraphernalia, arising out of the execution of a search 
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warrant at a private residence in which he was visiting (R. 7-8). 
Following a hearing in which his motion to suppress was denied, 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony (R. 31, 32, 34-40). After the grant of one extension, 
this timely appeal was filed (R. 48, 50, 59). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officers from the Department of Corrections and the DEA 
Metro Task Force received information from a reliable 
confidential informant that a man named Arturo was selling drugs 
between 10:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. each day out of a private 
residence in Salt Lake City (R. 89, 90, 111, 113). The informant 
also told police that a fugitive named Randy was living in the 
home, which was owned by Frank Penman, and that persons in the 
home were using drugs (R. 89-90, 95). 
Based on this information, police set up undercover 
surveillance (R. 114). Taking shifts of several hours over the 
course of two days, they observed twenty-one persons arriving at 
the residence and then leaving again after only short stays (R. 
90-91, 114)• When the officers ran license plate checks, they 
discovered that several of these individuals "had been involved 
in narcotics violations in the past" (R. 91). 
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The police then prepared a search warrant and affidavit, 
requesting authorization for a day or nighttime no-knock entry 
(See Def.'s Ex. 1-D or addendum A). The warrant was approved as 
requested (addendum A; search warrant at 3). 
On the evening of January 25, 1995, just as it was beginning 
to get dark, the officers executed the search warrant (R. 89, 94, 
97). Displaying visible identification as police officers and 
wearing "full raid gear," nine or ten officers entered the home 
with weapons drawn, using a ram to get through the front door and 
simultaneously announcing themselves as police (R. 96-98, 120). 
Seven adult males were in the home, all of whom were 
immediately ordered to the ground (R. 100, 129). Agent Metcalf 
testified that he saw needles and "twists"1 on the coffee table 
and needles on a couch in plain view (R. 99). Agent Smilker 
grabbed defendant, who was sitting on the couch, and took him 
into an adjacent hallway to secure him (R. 138, 141). He then 
asked defendant if he had any needles or sharp objects (R. 138). 
Defendant did not answer, and Agent Smilker pat-searched him. 
Agent Smilker testified: "On the pat-down, I was patting him 
1
 A "twist" refers to drug-packaging paraphernalia, often 
the corner of a small plastic baggie in which drugs are placed 
and then twisted shut, similar to the packaging on a single piece 
of hard candy. 
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down on the upper part of the body and I, as I was working down, 
I felt an object in his right pocket which, through my 
experience, I believed to be a syringe upon the feeling...." (R. 
139-40). Smilker then asked defendant again if he had any 
syringes, and defendant said something like, "It's not mine." (R. 
149). Then, Smilker testified, *I opened the coat up very 
cautiously and as I opened it up I could see an orange cap 
sticking out. I was, you know, careful in retrieving that." 
(Id-). 
Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (heroin) within a 
thousand feet of a school and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia (R. 5-8). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was in a private residence at the moment police 
officers executed a no-knock search warrant, looking for a drug 
dealer, drug users, a fugitive, and related drugs, paraphernalia 
and documentation. Relying primarily on Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 
U.S. 85 (1979), defendant claims that the officers lacked 
particularized information that he was armed or dangerous and so 
had no right to frisk him. Ybarra. however, involved a search 
warrant executed at a public tavern, where the public freely 
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entered and legal business was transacted. Nothing about the 
facts of that case implicated Ybarra as being involved in any 
untoward activity. In contrast, this case involves a private 
residence used for on-going drug-dealing, where casual, innocent 
visitors would not be found. In addition, in a private home, 
officers run a higher risk of being confronted by an occupant 
with ready access to weapons hidden within the home. Looking at 
all of the circumstances, the intrusion on defendant here is 
outweighed by the officers' need to protect themselves from the 
potential for violence associated with a narcotics search in a 
private home. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court's ruling 
validating the frisk establishes a bright-line rule authorizing 
officers executing narcotics warrants to automatically frisk 
everyone found on the premises. Defendant, however, reaches 
beyond the plain language of the court's ruling to arrive at this 
conclusion. 
Assuming the Court agrees that the frisk of defendant is 
constitutionally sound, the most direct justification for the 
search of defendant's pocket is the plain feel exception to the 
warrant requirement. That is, in the course of the frisk, when 
the officer felt what he immediately recognized as a syringe, he 
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had the necessary probable cause to open the jacket and remove 
the contraband. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court's finding that 
there were needles and other paraphernalia in plain view is 
clearly erroneous. Only if the Court determines that the frisk 
of defendant was improper need it even reach this issue. It can 
be resolved in favor of the trial court's ruling on the basis of 
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. 
ARgUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
DETERMINED THAT THE POLICE HAD 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO FRISK 
DEFENDANT UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT FACED THEM WHEN 
THEY EXECUTED THE SEARCH WARRANT 
The gist of defendant's argument is that the officers who 
executed the search warrant had no particularized information 
that defendant was presently armed or dangerous and, 
consequently, that they frisked him unlawfully. In addition, 
defendant argues that the trial court's ruling upholding the 
frisk authorizes "automatic patdowns of everyone found on the 
premises of any warrant execution searching for drugs" (Br. of 
App. at 15). Defendant's argument fails on the facts of this 
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particular case and as an assertion of a broader rule of law. 
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court established an exception to warrantless searches, 
including patdown searches. The Court defined a frisk for 
dangerous weapons as "a carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which 
might be used to assault [the officer]." Id. at 30. To justify 
a patdown, the officer must be able to articulate specific facts 
which, along with the rational inferences that may be drawn from 
those facts, reasonably support the intrusion. Id. at 21. At 
its core, Mt]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger." Id. at 27. Nonetheless, "there 
is no ready test for reasonableness other than by balancing the 
need to search against the invasion which the search entails." 
Id. at 21/ accord State v. Roybal. 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1996) (codifying the Terry frisk) . 
In Ybflrrfr v, Illinois/ 444 U.S. 85 (1979), the primary case 
on which defendant relies for his assertion that the frisk in 
this case was unlawful, the United States Supreme Court 
analogized the frisk of a person present in a place where a 
search warrant is being executed to the stop-and-frisk street 
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encounter it addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) . The 
Court ruled that: 
[t]he "narrow scope' of the Terry exception 
[to the requirement of probable cause] does 
not permit a frisk for weapons on less than 
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at 
the person to be frisked, even though that 
person happens to be on the premises where an 
authorized narcotics search is taking place." 
Id. at 94. Accordingly, the Court determined that Ybarra, who 
was a patron of a public bar at the time a search warrant was 
executed, could not be frisked because officers did not have a 
reasonable belief that he was involved in any criminal activity 
or was armed or dangerous. Id. at 91. 
LaFave analyzes Ybarra at length, noting that the passage 
quoted above "was simply stated as a conclusion, and no effort 
was made to explain how it was arrived at or to assess whether 
warrant-execution cases were in any respect deserving of somewhat 
different analysis than on-the-street detention cases." 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(d) at 640 (1996).2 LaFave 
2
 LaFave suggests that a search warrant execution involves 
a more lengthy period of time in which the suspect and the 
officer will be in close proximity than does an on-the-street 
detention. In addition, executing a search warrant focuses the 
officer's investigative attention on the premises rather than on 
the unnamed person on the premises. LaFave, supra. at 640. Both 
of these circumstances would seem to call for a lesser degree of 
individualized suspicion to justify a frisk during a warrant 
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opines that there are significant differences between the two 
situations and that "Ybarra will not be the last word" on the 
degree of individualized suspicion necessary to justify a frisk 
in the warrant-execution context. Id, 
Recent cases have demonstrated the accuracy of LaFave's 
observations, distinguishing Ybarra in ways relevant to the 
instant case. Most important is the distinction between the 
public tavern at issue in Ybarra and the private home in which 
this search warrant was executed: 
Unlike a business open to the general public, 
a private residence does not attract casual 
visitors off the street. When the private 
residence has been judicially determined as 
the probable site of narcotic transactions, 
the occupants are very likely to be involved 
in drug trafficking in one form or another. 
Moreover, because of the private nature of 
the surroundings and the recognized 
propensity of persons "engaged in selling 
narcotics [to] frequently carry firearms to 
protect themselves from would-be robbers," 
[citation omitted] the likelihood that the 
execution than in the course of an on-the-street detention. See 
Yfrarrfl / 444 U.S. at 107(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ,^cf. Michigan 
v. Summers. 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981) (holding that occupant of 
premises may be seized and detained while search warrant 
executed; reasoning that "the execution of a warrant to search 
for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to 
sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 
evidence. The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants 
is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned 
command of the situation."). 
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occupants are armed or have ready 
accessibility to hidden weapons is 
conspicuously greater than in cases where, as 
in Ybarra. the public freely enters premises 
where legal business is transacted. 
People v. Thurman. 209 Cal. App.3d 817, 824-25 (1989). 
In Ybarra. then, the officers had no reason to believe that 
a random patron of a public tavern was armed or dangerous or 
involved in any criminal activity. In contrast, the facts of 
this case provided the officer with every reason to believe 
defendant was armed, dangerous, or involved in criminal activity. 
By sanctioning a no-knock search warrant, a magistrate had 
implicitly recognized the inherent dangerousness of the situation 
to the agents who would execute the warrant. The agents also 
recognized the danger, entering the home fully armed and wearing 
bullet-proof vests (R. 96). After the agents made their entry, 
sixteen people were jammed into what was repeatedly described as 
a "real small" or "pretty small" house (R. 138, 144). Any 
readily accessible but hidden weapons could be more easily 
reached by the occupants than by the officers. See State v. Guy. 
492 N.W.2d 311, 316 (1992) (executing search warrant in home can 
be more dangerous because suspects are on their own turf, may 
have ready access to weapons). Certainly the agents were not at 
liberty to avoid contact with those individuals who were unnamed 
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in the warrant, but were both present and possibly armed. 
While defendant was not assaultive or aggressive towards the 
officers, it is well recognized that "the execution of a warrant 
for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to 
sudden violence." Michigan v. Summers. 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981). 
As a California appellate court has noted: wTo require an officer 
to await an overt act of hostility . . . before attempting to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm which accompanies an 
occupant's presence in a probable drug trafficking residential 
locale, would be utter folly." People v. Thurman. 209 Cal. 
App.3d at 823. Especially in such close quarters, the officer's 
belief that his safety might be in danger was eminently 
reasonable. 
Compounding the dangerousness of the situation was the 
threat posed by the weapons associated with drug trafficking. 
While traditionally firearms were viewed as the main threat in 
executing narcotics search warrants, see, e.g.. State v. Guy. 492 
N.W.2d 311, 315 (Wis. 1992), the focus has broadened with the 
proliferation of AIDS among intravenous drug users. Syringes and 
needles are now considered to be dangerous weapons. See, e.g.. 
Prutefl St3,t3S v, Rue, 988 F.2d 94, 96 (10th Cir. 1993). Indeed, 
ua hypodermic needle in the possession of someone who might be a 
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drug addict is a potentially deadly object." People v. Autry, 
232 Cal. App.3d 365, 368 (1991). With the threat posed by 
contact with AIDS-contaminated blood, "a contaminated hypodermic 
needle is one of the more deadly objects one can imagine outside 
of firearms." Id. at 369. 
To require a higher degree of particularized suspicion than 
was present in this case would place police officers and agents 
in significant personal jeopardy.3 Here, the agents were 
entering a home pursuant to a warrant. They had acted on 
information leading them to believe drugs were being sold from 
the residence and, indeed, had corroborated the accuracy of that 
information through their own surveillance. A magistrate had 
ratified their investigation, determining that there was probable 
cause to believe the home was the site of drug trafficking and 
that a fugitive was being harbored there. When the agents 
entered the home just after 5:00 p.m., they found defendant, one 
of seven men present, in the living room (R. 98, 147). 
Corroborating the belief that the home was being used for drug 
3
 The assaultive climate in this country has changed 
significantly since Terry was decided. In 1966, there were 
23,851 assaults on police officers. In 1990, there were nearly 
72,000 such assaults. State v. Guy. 492 N.W.2d at 315 (citations 
omitted). Plainly, "the need for police to protect themselves 
has grown more urgent." Id. 
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trafficking, an agent saw several needles and twists on the 
coffee table and on the couch (R. 99) . In plain view on the 
kitchen table was a spoon used for cooking drugs (Ex. 2-D at page 
1 or addendum B). Under all of the circumstances attendant upon 
the execution of this search warrant in a private residence, the 
agents reasonably suspected that defendant was involved in drug 
trafficking and, as a participant, could be armed and dangerous. 
Plainly, the "brief, relatively private intrusion upon 
[defendant's] personal security pales in significance when 
balanced against the officer's need to protect himself and others 
from the documented potential for violence inherent in a 
judicially sanctioned search for narcotics in a private 
residence." People v. Thurman. 209 Cal. App.3d at 824. As a 
result, for his own protection, the agent was justified in 
frisking defendant. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court's determination 
that a frisk was lawful in this case establishes a bright-line 
rule, authorizing police officers executing narcotics search 
warrants to automatically frisk everyone found on the premises at 
the time the warrant is executed (Br. of App. at 15).4 
4
 Several states have adopted such a rule, but limited it 
to search warrants executed in private residences. Seef e.g.f 
14 
Defendant, however, reads the court's ruling more broadly than 
'"'its plain language permits, thus misconstruing its import. In 
pertinent part, the ruling states: 
[The officers] have to have clear guidance 
and it seems to me that once they're 
justified for the no-knock and once thev have 
a warrant that suggests that there's drug 
user drug dealing and fugitives and all that 
accompanied in this warrant/ when they go in 
the officers can both secure the parties that 
are there to assure [sic] their safety and 
assure the public's safety and to assure that 
there would be no destruction of evidence. 
And as part of that they can also do at least 
a pat-down search. 
(R. 215 or addendum C)(emphasis added). By its plain language, 
this ruling addresses the constellation of facts present in this 
particular case, including the judicial imprimatur of a no-knock 
warrant and probable cause that the agents would find drug 
dealing, drug use, and a fugitive within the home. The warrant 
also articulated the target of the warrant as a private 
residence. The court's ruling thus sets forth a bright-line test 
only to the extent that another case may present a set of 
circumstances factually similar to the instant facts. It does 
not, as defendant argues, purport to establish a rule condoning 
People v. Thurman. 209 Cal. App.3d at 824; State v. Altamont. 577 
A.2d 665 (R.I. 1990). 
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frisks of all persons present when any narcotics search warrant 
is executed.5 
POINT TWO 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S POCKET 
MAY BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE PLAIN 
FEEL EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT 
Assuming this Court determines that the frisk of defendant 
was proper, the most direct justification for opening his jacket 
and removing the syringe is the plain feel doctrine, a corollary 
to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. See 
Minnesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366 (1993). Pursuant to this 
exception, "an object felt during an authorized patdown search 
may be seized without a warrant if the item's incriminating 
character is immediately apparent, i.e., if the officer develops 
probable cause to believe that the item felt is contraband before 
going beyond the legitimate scope of the patdown search." People 
v. Champion. 549 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Mich. 1996)(adopting plain feel 
exception to warrant requirement); accord State v..Hudson. 874 
5
 In any event, defendant's reliance on State v. White. 856 
P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) to support his argument is entirely 
misplaced. Whitg involved a stop in a parking lot based on third 
party hearsay concerning personal drug use, not the execution of 
a search warrant in a private home based on a confidential 
informant's report of drug dealing and use, as well as of a 
fugitive's presence. White is irrelevant to this case. 
16 
P-2d 160 (Wash. 1994)(same). 
22?^  facts of this case fall squarely within the plain feel 
exception. Agent Smilker described the pivotal event: "On the 
patdown, I was patting him down on th^ upper part of the body and 
1/ a§ i was working down, I felt an object in his right pocket 
which, through my experience, I believed to be a syringe upon the 
feeling. . . ." (R. 139). At this juncture, when the agent felt 
what he immediately recognized as a syringe, he had developed the 
necessary probable cause to open the jacket and remove the 
contraband. &££ Minnesota v, Pickers*^, 508 u.s. at 375-76. 
The trial court so ruled. In explaining its rationale for 
upholding the search of defendant's pocket, the court began: xxIt 
seemed to me that once you get to the point where the officer is 
doin§
 a pat-down and feels a needle that you have, along with the 
othe^ circumstances which are part of this, probable cause to 
complete the search or probable cause to effect an arrest." 
(R- 225 or addendum D). Because this ruling is in accord with 
the plain feel exception to the warrant requirement, it should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT THREE 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
THAT PARAPHERNALIA WAS IN PLAIN 
VIEW IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, THE 
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT MAY ALSO BE 
JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST 
Defendant argues that the trial court's finding that there 
were ^ needles and other paraphernalia in plain view is clearly 
erroneous. If that evidence is excluded, he contends, no 
justification remains for arresting defendant and for searching 
him incident to that arrest (Br. of App. at 23) .6 This issue 
need only be reached if the Court determines that the frisk of 
defendant was unconstitutional and, therefore, requires a 
rationale unrelated to the frisk to justify the search of 
defendant's pocket. 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. £&£, e,gy, Stfrte v, gQPflman, 763 
P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988). This standard is met only when a 
finding is against the clear weight of the evidence or, although 
6
 Defendant, however, concedes that a spoon, categorized in 
the itemized evidence report as paraphernalia, was found in plain 
view on the kitchen table (Br. of App. at 21). Thus, even if 
this Court determines that the finding of needles in plain view 
was clearly erroneous, the presence of the spoon in plain view 
could still support the arrest and subsequent search incident to 
arrest. 
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there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, after 
"examining all of the evidence, is left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. See, e.g.. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)(reviewing court must find 
clear error if factual findings are not adequately supported by 
record, resolving all disputes in evidence in light most 
favorable to trial court's determination). The clearly erroneous 
standard of review gives great deference to the trial court 
because that court "is considered to be in the best position to 
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the 
proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope 
to garner from a cold record." Id. at 936 (citing In re J. 
Children. 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1983)). 
In this case, Agent Metcalf testified at the suppression 
hearing that he saw needles and "little twists that are 
indicative of narcotics use" in plain view on the living room 
coffee table and couch (R. 99, 123). In addition, while the 
needles and twists were not listed on the itemized^evidence 
report, the agent's narrative report of the search warrant 
execution states: "Several needles were found in the residence" 
(Def.'s Ex. 3-D at p. 2, line 14 or addendum E). On cross-
examination, defense counsel questioned the agent at length about 
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the absence of the needles from the itemized evidence report (R. 
124-27). Defendant also testified at the hearing, categorically 
denying the presence of any needles or paraphernalia in plain 
view (R. 148-49, 159-60). 
Prior to ruling, the trial court made a crucial credibility 
call: "And I listened to the testimony of the officers, and even 
though they didn't list the paraphernalia that was in the front 
room on the evidence sheet, I felt that they were credible" (R. 
225 or addendum D). Accordingly, the court upheld the search of 
defendant, denying the motion to suppress (R. 226 or addendum D). 
Under these circumstances, where the evidence was disputed, 
where defense counsel tried to impeach the agent's testimony, and 
where, despite counsel's effort, the trial court specifically 
found the officer to be credible, it is most appropriate for a 
reviewing court to defer to the trial court. £££, etgt, Brwier 
^ carver. 920 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Utah 1996); StatS v, Bfrgley, 681 
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). 
The finding that paraphernalia was in plain view, in 
conjunction \*ith the other information that led the officers to 
obtain a search warrant, constituted the necessary probable cause 
to arrest defendant. Applying the requisite objective analysis, 
from the facts known to the officers and the reasonable 
20 
inferences they could draw from those facts, it was reasonable 
for them to conclude that defendant was directly involved in drug 
trafficking or use. Consequently, they could validly arrest 
defendant and search him incident to that arrest.7 Seer e.g. . 
State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983)(quoting State v. Hatcher. 
495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Utah 1972)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the denial 
of defendant's suppression motion and affirm his conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / day of October, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
fyuvt-C-- JMh-k^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
7
 A search is not invalid where, as here, it precedes a 
formal arrest, as long as the two events occur within close 
temporal proximity of each other and probable cause to arrest 
exists independently of whatever is seized during the search. 
State v. Ayala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Utah App. 1988) (citing 
State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Utah 1986)). 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
No. 
SEARCH WARRANT 
[~ DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
I=IL 
<?S|<* C038S 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me 
by Theresa Sargent, I am satisfied that there is probable cause 
to believe; 
That on the person(s) known as "Randy and "Arturo* last names 
unknown who are known to reside or visit the residence to be 
searched; 
and/or 
in the vehicle described as a 1975 Ford 2T, Utah License 
#445 GRB, VIN #5G21H129360; 
and/or 
on the premises known as 1234 Iola, further described as 
being on the northeast corner of Iola and Concord, 
constructed of white aluminum siding with blue awnings over 
the front windows of the residence, with the number 1234 on 
the front of the residence by the front door along with all 
attached and unattached structures within the curtilage. 
In the city of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
1. Controlled substances, including but not limited to 
cocaine and marijuana; 
2. packaging material for the use, ingestion, and 
distribution of controlled substances; 
3. residency papers, and other'materials to identify the 
occupants and residents of the dwelling to be searched; 
4. U.S. currency used in the trafficking in or in 
proximity to controlled substances; 
5. records of controlled substance transactions; 
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and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to illegal conduct. 
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You are therefore commanded 
at any time day or night, good cause having been shown 
to execute without notice of authority or purpose, proof 
under oath being shown that the object of this search 
warrant may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm 
may result to any person if notice were given 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s) and/or 
vehicle(s) and/or premises for the herein-above described 
property or evidence and if you find the same or any part 
thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Third Circuit 
Court# County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such 
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated thi s 2 ^ day o^JkfM/^ 
Neal Gunnarson 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
B. KENT MORGAN, Bar No. 3945 
Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
RATE ^ ^ Y 
BEFORE: \ " v ' V ^ L f £-1 / /(/V^IAA/AA X 450 South 200 East 
VGISTRATE ^~^ V ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
% as 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned a£fiant# Theresa Sargent/ being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
That he/she has reason to believe 
That on the person(s) knovm as "Arturo" and -RandyH last names 
unknown who are known to reside or visit the residence to be 
searched; 
and/or 
in the vehicle described as a 1975 Ford 2T, Utah License 
#445 GRB, VIN #5G21H129360. 
and/or 
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on the premises known J 234 lola, further described as being 
located on the northeast corner of lola and Concord, constructed 
of white frame siding with blue awnings above the front windows, 
with the number 1234 attached to the residence next to the 
mailbox on the east side of the front door along with all 
attached and unattached structures within the curtilage. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
1. Controlled substances, including but not limited to 
cocaine and heroin; 
2. packaging material for the use, ingestion, and 
distribution of controlled substances: 
3. residency papers, and other materials to identify the 
occupants and residents of the dwelling to be searched; 
4. U.S. currency used in trafficking in or in proximity to 
controlled substances; 
5. records of controlled substance transactions; 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense/ or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime or crimes of possession, use and 
distribution of controlled substances. 
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The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are* 
Your affiant is employed by the Department of Corrections 
and is an investigator for the Investigations Bureau of the 
Department. Your affiant has seven years of law enforcement 
experience, and in that time has made and assisted with numerous 
drug-related arrests. Your affiant has certified peace officer 
authority within the State of Utah. Your affiant has been given 
the responsibility of enforcing all laws and conditions of parole 
pertaining to probationers, parolees, and inmates under the 
jurisdiction of the Utah State Department of Corrections. Your 
affiant has received in-service post certified training on drug 
recognition. Your affiant received advanced undercover drug 
training in Las Vegas, Nevada in 1994. Your affiant has worked 
the Intensive Drug Supervision Program in Davis County for three 
years. As part of that program your affiant has worked multi 
jurisdictional drug cases from 1989 to present. Your affiant is 
currently assigned drug cases which fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Corrections. Your affiant has worked in an 
undercover capacity as well as a narcotics case agent from 1989 
to the present. Your affiant is currently investigating a 
complaint relating to a controlled substance distribution 
operation being conducted at the main premises on this 
Warrant/Affidavit. Your affiant is also investigating a 
complaint of fugitives being harbored at the main premises on 
this Warrant/Affidavit. 
The facts to establish, grounds for a search warrant are: 
Within the last four days your affiant has conducted a drug 
investigation. Your affiant received information from a 
confidential informant, who wishes to remain confidential, that 
"Arturo", last name unknown, is distributing drugs for value. 
The confidential informant reports "Arturo" does not reside at 
this residence, however uses this residence from 10:00 a.m. until 
6:30 p.m. to distribute drugs with the permission of the owner, 
Frank Penman. The confidential informant stated'' "Jlandy" last name 
unknown is a parole fugitive and is residing at the premises on 
this Warrant/Affidavit. 
Surveillance of the residence was conducted between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. on January 20 and January 22, 1995. 
During the times of surveillance a total of twenty one 
individuals were observed arriving at the residence and leaving 
after short periods of time. The surveillance held on the 
residence was conducted for approximately two hour intervals on 
both ocassions. Several of the individuals arrived on foot and 
the remaining arrived in vehicles. Your affiant received age 
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information from the confidential informant that "Randy last 
name unknown, is a parole fugitive and is residing at this 
address to avoid apprehension. 
The investigation revealed some individuals frequenting the 
residence have been arrested for the 
transportation/possession/manufacture of drugs. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
Confidential Informant reliable because he/she has worked as a 
confidential informant for DEA. Detective Maria Tellas/Waters of 
DEA indicated the Confidential Informant has introduced her to 
several drug dealers and she has successfully purchased 
controlled substances from these -dealers-. Confidential 
Informant has also provided information to the U.S. Marshalls, 
specifically Rick Lovelace, regarding the location of a federal 
fugitive. The Marshalls were able to successfully apprehend the 
fugitive without incident based solely on information provided by 
the confidential informant. 
Your affiant asks the Court not to require your affiant to 
reveal the name of the CI for fear of physical retaliation by the 
suspect(s) involved in this case or by any of the criminal 
associates. Threats of physical harm against individuals thought 
to be confidential informants are commonplace. 
Through information received from the confidential 
informant, "Arturo" brings approximately two to three grams of 
heroin and two to three ounces of cocaine on his person, into the 
residence to sell. Due to the high risk factor that the suspect 
will destroy evidence a3ong with the fact fugitives are in the 
residence who are avoiding apprehension, for the safety of the 
officers involved and the preservation of evidence, your affiant 
is requesting a no knock search warrant. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
Personal observations of what appears to be drug trafficking 
at the residence previously described in this affidavit and 
the personally observation of official records listing 
criminal histories and parole status of those individuals 
observed at the residence. 
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WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
at any time day or night because there is reason to believe 
it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good 
roasons, to wit: 
As previously described, the cover of darkness will help 
protect the officers executing the warrant and prevent the 
destruction of evidence. 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested 
warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's authority 
or purpose because: 
physical harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
There are individuals in the residence who have warrants for 
their arrests and are avoiding apprehension• 
INVESTIGATOR THERESAJSARG1 ENT 
AFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 
1995 
ADDENDUM B 
#fosr / M!:irtuivitiviu EVIDENCE REPORT 
OFFICERS Atuae ja&Gsc / <&?^r stf&axr 
DATE ETINE'PLACED IN EVIDENCE 
/73d Mr. 
CASE NUMBER 
7&/6S? 
PNIROL i 
/- x#*"&r &**&&) rfHERE LOCATED 6Y 
c*-
/H&SkF 
r&2<f73Z>* 
EVIDENCE -DESCRIPTION TYPE 
QUANTITY 
e*4*t/°^ s^&TTfefi 
/•* /-*• *r 
T 
SK 
|2 DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
:o 
FOUND OR LOCATED 
NAIURE OF THE COMPLAI OFFICER ASSIGNED CASE .* 
ADDRESS PROPERTIES 
CHAIN OF EVIDENCE > ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ < ^
 —
^ ^ 
ORIGINATING JURISDICTION ltfM UOfJ ^ 
SCc <3*2? 
REUEASED TO TOXICOLOGIST 
Dote Time. 
Officer 
Released by_ 
I.D.#_ 
I.D.#_ 
RETURNED FROM TOXICOLOGIST 
Date Time 
Officer 
Released by. 
I.D.#_ 
I.D.#_ 
TOX. RECEIVING EVID. 
OAIE-IIHE 
AGENCY 
NAME OF OFFENDER. 
ARRESTED 
YES NO MISD FEL ADUU JU 
DD DD DC 
ALL ARTICLES PLACED IN EVIDENCE AS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE RELEASED ON-DATE. 
To By -
Release Authorized By To_ 
PROPER!f CUSTODIAN ONLY 
SIGNATURE OF PERSON RECEIVING PROPERTY 
Company. Address. 
EVIDENCE REPORT 
OFFICERS 
D A T E U I N & PUCEO IN EVIDENCE 
/tfAy? Azzfe*^ /$r&<r j^^T^^ 
1
 ^ JO^  . _ _ _ ^ 1 _ , J I ^ 
CASE NUMBER [CONTI 
-/osy 
-HERE
 t0«TEO rfj^^ 
&J /)^M OAJ^4 {ZrjUKi&r) CI.£ O.C/SAKJCV 
1 EVIDENCE-DESCRIPTION TYPE 
QUANTITY 
10 
ES MATURE OF THE COMPLAINT s OFFICER ASSIGNED, CASE Q ^^ 
ADDRESS PROPERY WAS FOUND OR LOCATED 
    ^ . - lORIGINATING JURISDICTION 
*</ ^2&S /far <CarT ALr^t A^gxrrcs 
^ ~^ A&72Z^ / ^ ^ Ch.MN Of EVIDENCE 
RETURNED FROM TOXICOLOtflSTO 
Dote Time. 
Officer. 
RELEASED TO TOXICOLOGIC 
Date Time. 
Officer 
Released by_ 
I.D.#_ 
I.D.JL Released by. 
I.D.#_ 
I.D.*_ 
I0X. RECEIVING EVIO. 
DATE- TIME 
AGENCf 
NAME OF OFFENDER. 
ARRESTED 
YES NO MISD FEL ADULT Jl 
DD DD DC 
ALL ARTICLES PLACED IN EVIDENCE AS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE RELEASED ON-DATE. 
To By_ 
Release Authorized By To_ 
PROPERTY CUST0OIAN ONLY 
SIGNATURE Tf PERSON RECEDING PRCPERH 
Company- Address. 
EVIDENCE REPORT 
ffflte S> EVIDENCE REPORT 
OFFICERS 
DATE t T U N P L A C E D IN EVIDENCE 
A<ea%2£ /ster**^ 
CASE NUMBER 
qs^/er? 
CONTROL / 
/mA^/#*M«=# /dte&4-•*H£R£ LOCATED „ BY . _ 
\~&/3?&h/fr^ 
EVI0£NC£ -DESCRIPTION 
rtiJ Ati7&jfo<2&Lti0l4$ 
J*L 
3- <&&njir Aj/j&Mr~ >fA40«6 &QO* 
TYPE 
QUANTITY 
stteTGW^X q£W&S&> 
Y&tfza&Hf 
'/tfZ'tfl^se<n>0 
7d477?£tf {Ar/hteT-
10 
IS NATURE Of THE COMPLAIN! '5 OFFICER ASSIGNED CASE ^^ ^ 
-QORESS PROPERTY WAS FOUND OR LOCATED >  L ^ - ^ ORIGINAIING JURISDICTION
 y y 
/ £ ? < / -TS&L/fyg' <ZZotir^ /Z/&>?6/kernes 
CHAIN Of EVIDENCE 
^ "Z> s4Gn&&£~-^' ffezte^-i^- JT^ .C <3&. ^ ^ 
RELEASED TO TOXICOLOGIST 
Date Time. 
Officer 
Released by 
I.D.#_ 
I.D.*. 
RETURNED FROM TOXICOLOGIST o 
Date Time 
Officer 
Released by. 
I.D.#_ 
I.D.#_ 
TOX. DECEIVING EVlD. 
DATE -TIME 
AGENCl 
NAME OF OFFENDER. 
ARRESTED 
YES NO MISD FEL ADULT JU 
DD DD DC 
ALL ARTICLES PLACED IN EVIDENCE AS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE RELEASED ON-DATE. 
To B y -
Release Authorized By To_ 
PROPERTY CUSTODIAN ONLY 
SIGNATURE Of PERSON RECEIVING PROPERTY 
Company- Address. 
EVIDENCE REPORT 
ADDENDUM C 
1 WE'RE USING AS FAR AS THE INDEPENDENT PROBABLE CAUSE, IF 
2 HE'S NOT NAMED IN THE WARRANT— 
3 THE COURT: RIGHT. I GUESS WHAT I — I SEQUENCE 
4 IT DIFFERENTLY. IT SEEMS TO ME— AND I HEARD ENOUGH OF 
5 YOUR ARGUMENT THAT I THINK I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION ON 
6 THIS, AND I THINK I'M PREPARED TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF 
7 THE TERRY FRISK, IN MY MIND, THAT THERE IS A BASIS FOR A 
8 TERRY FRISK. AND I THINK THE DISPOSITIVE CRITICAL FACTS 
9 ARE THE ONES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE 
10 ONES THAT ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR THE NO-KNOCK WARRANT: 
11 THE FACT THAT WE HAVE SURVEILLANCE OF THE HOUSE 
12 INDICATING SHORT-TERM VISITS, WE HAVE CONFIDENTIAL 
13 I INFORMANTS, WE HAVE AT LEAST REASONABLE SUSPICION, OR 
14 I MORE THAN THAT WE HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT 
15 THERE'S A FUGITIVE IN THE HOUSE AND THAT THERE IS A 
16 SUSPECTED DRUG DEALER IN THE HOUSE. 
17 ALL OF THAT SEEMED TO ME TO CREATE A TOTALITY 
18 OF CIRCUMSTANCES FROM WHICH THE OFFICER COULD FIND A 
19 BASIS FOR CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY THAT WOULD JUSTIFY 
20 A SEARCH, A TERRY FRISK, AS PART OF THE Ntt-KNOCK IN 
21 SECURING WHAT I WAS INTERESTED IN BEARING ARGUMENTS 
22 ABOUT. AND I THINK I'M SATISFIED WHEN OFFICERS GO ON AND 
23 SECVRE A PREMISE, TO IMPOSE UPON THEM THE DUTY TO SORT OF 
24 LOAK AT. EVERYBODY AND SAY: OKAY W, I'M NOT GOING TO 
25 I SEASCH YOU. I CAN PAT YOU DOT?K *' OING TO HANDCUFF 
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1 YOU. 
2 THAT'S ASKING FOR TOO MUCH REFINEMENT OF WHAT 
3 IS OTHERWISE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION. THEY HAVE TO 
4 HAVE CLEAR GUIDANCE AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ONCE THEY'RE 
5 JUSTIFIED FOR THE NO-KNOCK AND ONCE THEY HAVE A WARRANT 
6 THAT SUGGESTS THAT THERE'S DRUG USE, DRUG DEALING AND 
7 FUGITIVES AND ALL THAT ACCOMPANIED IN THIS WARRANT, WHEN 
8 THEY GO IN TBE OFFICERS CAN BOTB SECURE TBE PARTIES THAT 
9 ARE THERE TO ASSURE THEIR SAFETY AND ASSURE THE PUBLIC'S 
10 SAFETY AND TO ASSURE TBAT TBERE WOULD BE NO DESTRUCTION 
11 OF EVIDENCE. AND AS PART OF THAT THEY CAN ALSO DO AT 
12 LEAST A PAT-DOWN SEARCH. 
13 AND I THINK THAT TAKES US TO WHAT I CONSIDER TO 
14 BE THE LAST STEP OF THIS THING. ALL RIGHT. THEY DO A 
15 PAT DOWN AND MAYBE GO BEYOND THAT WITH RESPECT TO THIS 
16 DEFENDANT. I DON'T THINK I'M RULING ON WHETHER OR NOT 
17 THEY HAD ANY RIGHT TO GET INTO HIS POCKET. THERE'S THE 
18 ONE CASE THAT WAS REFERRED TO ME WHICH INDICATED, YOU 
19 KNOW, A SOFT POUCH IS NOT A WEAPON. THAT'S THE— 
20 IS THAT WHAT THAT CASE SAYS? A^  SOFT POUCH? 
21 I MR. MAURO: YBARRA. 
22 I MR. MEISTER: AYALA. 
2*3 THE COURT: AYALA. 
24 I MR. MAURO; AYALA. 
25 THE COUK'J^  AYALA, THAT'S THE CASE. 
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THE SCENE OF THE CRIME WITHOUT MORE, BEING INSUFFICIENT 
TO FORM A BASIS FOR, IN THOSE CASES, REASONABLE 
SUSPICION. IN THIS CASE I SUGGEST THE STATE NEEDS 
PROBABLE CAUSE. AND THOSE CASES ARE CITED, BROWN VERSUS 
TEXAS, STEWART— THERE'S ALSO A CASE CALLED STATE VERSUS 
MUNSON, AND IN MUNSON THEY SAID THE MERE PROPINQUITY TO 
OTHERS SUSPECTED OF A CRIME IS NOT A BASIS TO CONDUCT THE 
REASONABLE SUSPICION STOP, MUCH LESS IN THIS CASE A 
PROBABLE CAUSE STOP. 
WITH TEAT, YOUR HONOR, WE'LL SUBMIT IT. 
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK I'M READY TO RULE ON 
THIS. 
IT SEEMED TO ME THAT ONCE YOU GET TO THE POINT 
WHERE THE OFFICER IS DOING A PAT-DOWN AND FEELS A NEEDLE 
THAT YOU HAVE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH 
ARE PART OF THIS, PROBABLE CAUSE TO COMPLETE THE SEARCH 
OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO EFFECT AN ARREST. AND I LISTENED TO 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS, AND EVEN THOUGH THEY 
DIDN'T LIST THE PARAPHERNALIA THAT WAS IN THE FRONT ROOM 
ON THE EVIDENCE SHEET, I FELT THAT THEY WERE CREDIBLE. 
CERTAINLY THEY COULDN'T IDENTIFY THAT PARAPHERNALIA AS 
BEING THE DEFENDANT'S IN THE CASE. BUT IN MY VIEW T=iE 
FACT THAT THERE WAS PARAPHERNALIA AROUND THERE AS WELL AS 
THE PRESENCE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING, WHICH I THINK T?AS 
CLEARLY IDENTIFIED, ALONG WITH THE OTHER FACTORS T*\? 
00022;; 
1 HAVE ALREADY BEEN ENUNCIATED AT THE HEARING, IT SEEMED TO 
2 ME THAT THERE WAS PLENTY OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST AND 
3 A SEARCH INCIDENT TO THAT ARREST WHICH WAS SUFFICIENTLY 
4 CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE DISCOVERY OF THE NEEDLE WHICH 
5 WAS DETECTED BY THE PAT-DOWN TO BE A PROPER BASIS TO DENY 
6 THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. SO FOR THE REASONS THE COURT 
7 STATED I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION. 
8 I WOULD ASK MR. MEISTER IF YOU WOULD PREPARE 
9 DETAILED FINDINGS ON THIS. I THINK WE HAVE A CASE IN 
10 WHICH THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CLOSE QUESTIONS. I THINK 
11 THAT THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS FOUND AND STATED ON THE 
12 RECORD BY BOTH PARTIES AND BY YOU WHEN YOU ARGUED, THE 
13 COURT OUGHT TO BE FULLY REFLECTED SO THE APPELLATE COURT 
14 WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO UNDERSTAND EACH OF THE STAGES OF 
15 THE DECISION, BECAUSE I THINK IT'S A CLOSE ENOUGH CASE 
16 THAT IT MAY WELL GO ON APPEAL. 
17 MR. MEISTER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
18 I (THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
23 
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EXHIBIT 
I CASE # 95-1057 |l ^ 7 9 * 6 355 
%' SEARCH WARRANT AT 1234 IOLA AVE SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
5 JANUARY 25 #1995 
& 
H CASE AGENT STEPHEN METCALF 
5 ASSISTING OFFICERS: THERESA^GABALDON UDC, SGT BRAD BLAIR, TFO MARK 
t MEHRER, *TFO DICK TISHNER.^LED LUCEY UDC,®TFO TROY NAYLOR,$ART 
7 STREET UDC,©KEVIN NITZEL UDC,®TFO KEN YURGEL0N,(5TF0 TOM RUSSELL, 
8 SCOTT CHRISTENSEN UDC,QillCK SPILKER UDC. 
<» On January 25, 1995 a joint operation between the Utah Department 
ic of Corrections and the DEA-Metro Task Force was culminated with the 
« execution of a search warrant at 1234 lola in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
*i At 1707 hours on January 25, 1995 entry was made without incident 
i3 at the residence. Found in the residence were seven individuals. 
H Arturo Cordova DOB 4-17-65, Frank Penman 3-28-47, Randall Dean 
£ Chatfield 11-21-51, David Drage 5-11-62, Ramom Corales 12-23-60, 
fe Francisco Aragon 3-24-47, and Jay Gray 1-12-35. 
Vf Upon entry I encountered an individual later identified as Frank 
6 Penman. Mr. Penman was handcuffed for officer safety and sat on the 
fl floor. I then handcuffed Arturo Cordova and also placed him on the 
2c floor. After all individuals were secured. I asked Mr. Penman if he 
z\ had any thing he shouldn't have on him. He stated he did not. I 
** again asked him if he had any needles on him. He stated he did not. 
** Mr. Penman was searched incident to arrest and was not found to 
m have any contraband on his person. I then sat Mr. Penman on the 
2£ couch. Mr. Cordova was asked in he had any needles on his person 
i<, and he stated Mno but I have some drugs." I asked Cordova if he had 
zf Mcheevav< (cheeva is the Spanish term for heroin) on him and he 
28 stated "yes and cocaine." Upon searching Arturo Cordova I found 
2j approximately 1 ounce of heroin in his left front pocket and 1/8 
5o ounce of cocaine in his right front pocket. 
31 I also found a quantity of U.S. Currency on his person. The 
& controlled substances were turned over to evidence custodian Mark 
33 Mehrer. These substances were field tested in my presence by 
3tf evidence custodian Mark Mehrer and showed positive for cocaine and 
35 heroin. The heroin was in 8 separate packages weighing 
ak approximately 1/2 ounce total and the remaining was in one large 
jj piece this large piece also weighed approximately 1/2 ounce. 
j 
2. 
"' The person in the residence identified as Randall Dean Chatfield 
t was found to be wanted on a Parole violation warrant from the Utah 
3 State Board of Pardons. During a search incident to arrest, 
H Chatfield was found to be in possession of four syringes. Chatfield 
5 initially resisted officers and appeared to be hiding something. 
t However no other contraband aside from the syringes were found. 
7 Chatfield indicated he knew he was wanted and also stated he has 
B been using heroin. 
? The person identified as David Drage 5-11-62f was found to be in jo possession of a syringe filled with a substance identified as 
i» heroin, (field test positive). Prior to the search of Drage he was 
it asked if he had any needles on him and he stated he did not. Search 
i3 incident to arrest the needle filled with heroin was found. 
*¥ Several needles were found in the residence. The other individuals 
i* were not found to be in possession of any contraband and were 
f* released. 
17 David Drage was booked in the Salt Lake County Jail on charges of 
it possession of heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. Arturo 
i$ Cordova was booked in the Salt Lake County Jail on charges of 
2c Possession of heroin with the intent to distribute and Possession 
n of cocaine with the intent to distribute. The individuals were 
a* booked without incident by Theresa Gabaldon and Leo Lucey. 
** Randall Dean Chatfield was turned over to AP&P Agents Jeff Stickley 
fcV and Paul Truelson for transportation and booking. 
7S Stephen Metcalf 
z* DEA-Metro Task Force 
